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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
NORMS FOR INSURANCE REGULATION 
Elizabeth F. Brown* 
ABSTRACT 
The development of international norms for insurance has not pro-
gressed as far or as deeply as the development of international norms for 
banking. Several factors have affected this process. First, the efforts to 
develop such norms are relatively new. The International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”) has existed for less than fifteen years 
while the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has existed for over 
thirty years. Second, the membership of the IAIS makes it harder for that 
organization to achieve consensus on principles and standards than for 
the Basel Committee. The IAIS has members from almost 140 nations, 
including both developed and less developed nations, while the Basel 
Committee is comprised of only thirteen members from only developed 
nations. 
Finally, the fact that insurance is regulated by the states within the 
United States has hindered the ability of the United States to conduct 
effective international negotiations on insurance regulation. The individ-
ual states have not adopted uniform insurance laws. As a result, they do 
not necessarily espouse the same positions when participating in interna-
tional bodies like the IAIS. In addition, the federal government has diffi-
culty translating the soft law standards developed by the IAIS into hard 
law in treaties and international agreements because it currently lacks the 
power to force the states to change their insurance laws to conform to the 
negotiated standards. The states also cannot translate the soft law stan-
dards developed by the IAIS into hard international laws because they 
currently are not authorized to conduct negotiations for treaties or bind-
ing international agreements on insurance. Until the United States creates 
a body capable of conducting international negotiations that can bind the 
states, the development of international insurance standards will continue 
to proceed more slowly than the development of standards for other fi-
nancial services sectors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
he development of international norms and standards for many 
types of insurance is a relatively new phenomenon when com-
pared with the development of international norms and standards for oth-
er commercial activities, such as trade in goods or banking. This is per-
haps because many types of insurance were considered to be governed 
primarily by local, rather than international, conditions. Life insurance, 
property and casualty insurance, and health insurance comprise the larg-
est sectors within insurance based on premiums. In each case, local laws 
and local conditions have a significant impact on shaping the risks in-
sured against by insurance firms. The local character of insurance mar-
kets has been the major justification as to why insurance is regulated al-
most exclusively by the states within the United States, rather than by the 
federal government. 
Nevertheless, a number of factors are putting increasing pressure on 
governments and market participants to develop international norms and 
standards for insurance. First, financial services1 markets are increasingly 
interconnected which means that the risks posed by one region or sector 
can more easily spill out and affect other regions and sectors. This inter-
connectedness is due, in part, to the increasing number of fungible finan-
cial products and services. Hybrid products that contain elements of tra-
ditional banking, securities, or insurance products are being created more 
frequently now than ever before. These products are breaking down the 
distinctions among the banking, securities, and insurance sectors. The 
result is that financial services now form a continuum, rather than dis-
tinct silos, for banking, insurance, and securities. 
Financial products also are linking previously separate sectors as prod-
ucts from one sector are repackaged to spread and diversify the risks. 
The current financial crisis has highlighted this fact as mortgages, a tradi-
tional banking product, were sold to special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) 
that bundled them together and issued securities that would pay based on 
the income stream generated by the mortgage payments. The risk that 
                                                                                                             
 1. In this Article, financial services refers to any activity considered financial in 
nature pursuant to section 103 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), in-
cluding banking, securities, merchant banking, and insurance products and services. 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1999). This definition of financial 
services is not universally applied by other organizations. For example, the Basel II Capi-
tal Accord excludes insurance activities from the definition of “financial activities” and 
excludes insurance entities from the definition of “financial entities.” BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE 
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 7 n.5 
(2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf. 
T
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those securities would default was insured against either by the SPV tak-
ing out bond insurance on the securities or by the purchasers entering 
into credit default swaps. 
Second, technology is also making it easier to purchase products and 
services from distant suppliers. Insurance companies already use e-mail 
and blogs to sell their products.2 Insurance marketing consulting firms, 
like IdeaStar Inc., are encouraging insurance firms to consider how to 
market their products using Facebook, Linkedin, Twitter, and YouTube, 
all of which reach a global audience.3 Insurance publications discuss oth-
er ways that insurance firms can expand their online traffic, such as using 
search engine optimization techniques to improve their search engine 
rankings and contracting with related websites for fees generated by us-
ers of those sites clicking through to the insurance companies’ websites.4 
In addition, the Internet allows individual consumers to compare the 
prices and products of insurance companies from around the world. All 
of these developments are weakening the ties that traditionally made in-
surance a financial product dominated by local or regional concerns. 
Third, as the markets in the United States and the European Union ma-
ture, the multinational insurance and financial conglomerates are expand-
ing their operations in emerging markets and ratcheting up the global 
competition for market shares in insurance. The European Union com-
prised thirty-seven percent of the worldwide life, property, and casualty 
insurance premiums in 2007, while the United States comprised thirty-
two percent.5 The areas showing the largest potential for growth in the 
near future are nations in Asia, other than Japan, and Latin America.6 
                                                                                                             
 2. For example, Insurance Broadcasting provides a directory of insurance blogs, 
including a number of blogs associated with insurance businesses. See Insurance Broad-
casting, Insurance Blog Directory, http://insuranceblogdirectory.com/?gclid=CJXT-bLgv 
pkCFQXGsgod0XX-5Q (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
 3. See IdeaStar, Insurance Affinity Marketing Strategies and the Decline of Snail Mail, 
Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.insurance-technologies.com/News/decline-of-snail-mail.aspx. 
 4. Al Slavin, Contact Me . . . If You Can, BEST’S REV., Mar. 2009, at 26, 27. 
 5. John A. Cooke & Harold D. Skipper, An Evaluation of the US Insurance Regula-
tion in a Competitive World Insurance Market 3 (June 27, 2008) (unpublished manu-
script, presented at AEI Conference: The Future of Insurance Regulation, available at 
http://www.rmi.gsu.edu/insurance_regulation/rel_papers/CookeSkipper_RegulationIntern
ational.pdf). 
 6. Id. at 4. 
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are attempting to address the same sorts of problems. Insurance laws 
around the world tend to incorporate regulations that address both pru-
dential and market conduct risks.10 As a result, they tend to have similar 
features, although they can still vary greatly. Finally, group or committee 
standard setting can result in soft law, such as nonbinding principles or 
guidelines, developed by intergovernmental forums like the IAIS or in-
dustry groups like the International Union of Credit and Investment In-
surers.11 
The way the United States regulates insurance has proven to be a sig-
nificant impediment to the development of hard international law in that 
area. The states within the United States are the main insurance regula-
tors. They, however, lack the authority under the U.S. Constitution to 
negotiate binding international agreements on insurance.12 The federal 
government, which has the authority under the U.S. Constitution to nego-
tiate such agreements,13 has no agency tasked with regulating insurance 
that could conduct such negotiations. The U.S. Trade Representative’s 
Office, which negotiated GATS, lacks the authority to bind the states and 
to ensure that they will enact the necessary domestic laws to codify any 
concession that it might make.14 As a result, the international agreements 
on insurance negotiated to date contain substantial exemptions for U.S. 
states’ insurance laws.15 The breadth of these exemptions means that, in 
many cases, the principles embodied in GATS and other trade agree-
ments are not binding on the states within the United States and the ex-
tent to which the states meet these principles is more a function of soft 
law rather than hard law. 
A number of international forums currently promote the development 
of soft law international norms in the area of insurance. The primary fo-
rum is the IAIS, which has over 190 members (including the insurance 
commissions from all fifty states within the United States). The Joint 
Forum, which is comprised of the IAIS, the Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision (“Basel Committee”), and the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”), sets guidelines for issues that are 
common to banking, securities, and insurance, such as the regulation of 
                                                                                                             
 10. Cooke & Skipper, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 11. See Ahdieh, supra note 8, at 25–26. 
 12. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign 
powers and prohibits the states from negotiating international agreements with foreign 
powers without the consent of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10. 
 13. Id. art. I, § 8. 
 14. Cooke & Skipper, supra note 5, at 18. 
 15. Id. at 18–19 & n.27. 
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financial conglomerates.16 Some hybrid products, like variable annuities, 
are regulated by both insurance and securities regulators.17 As a result, 
the activities of IOSCO have an impact on the development of regulatory 
standards for some insurance products.18 
The IAIS, IOSCO, and the Basel Committee are also members of the 
Financial Stability Forum (“FSF”), which brings together the national 
financial supervisory authorities in order “to assess vulnerabilities affect-
ing the international financial system; to identify and oversee action 
needed to address these; and to improve co-ordination and information 
exchange among the various authorities responsible for financial stabili-
ty.”19 Among other things, the FSF promotes the implementation of in-
ternational standards by national financial supervisory authorities, in-
cluding those governing insurance.20 On April 2, 2009, the membership 
of the FSF was expanded to include Spain and the European Commis-
sion, and the FSF was renamed the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”).21 
In addition, the FSB’s mandate grew to include, among other things, un-
dertaking strategic reviews of the policy development work being done 
by IAIS, IOSCO, and the Basel Committee, setting guidelines for creat-
ing international “supervisory colleges” to monitor the largest financial 
services firms, and assisting the IMF on Early Warning Exercises con-
cerning financial crises.22 
                                                                                                             
 16. Press Release, IOSCO, Joint Forum—Amplified Mandate (June 14, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS3.pdf; IOSCO Joint Forum, http://www. 
iosco.org/joint_forum/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
 17. See VARIABLE ANNUITY MODEL REGULATION § 4 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 
1996) (discussing procedures for separate accounts); Press Release, SEC, SEC and 
NASD Release Joint Staff Report on Broker-Dealer Sales of Variable Insurance Products 
(June 9, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-80.htm. 
 18. For example, IOSCO issued a lengthy report on international derivatives regula-
tion. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
DERIVATIVE MARKETS, PRODUCTS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES (1996), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD65.pdf. 
 19. Financial Stability Forum—Mandate, http://www.fsforum.org/about/mandate.htm 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2009); Financial Stability Forum—Overview, http://www.fsforum. 
org/about/overview.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
 20. See Financial Stability Forum, http://www.fsforum.org/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
For a list of members of the FSF, see Financial Stability Forum—Overview, supra note 
19. 
 21. Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum, Financial Stability Forum Re-established as 
the Financial Stability Board 1 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.fsforum.org/ 
press/pr_090402b.pdf. 
 22. Id. at 2; Elena Moya, Financial Stability Board: How It Will Work, GUARDIAN, 
Apr. 4, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/04/financial-stability-board-g20. 
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The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) promotes insurance regulation standards through its Insurance 
and Private Pensions Committee.23 The OECD has adopted the Code of 
Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations (“Invisibles Code”).24 This 
code deals with standards for the intangible trade in insurance, securities, 
banking, and investments.25 The International Actuarial Association 
(“IAA”) and International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”) play 
roles by developing the actuarial and accounting standards for insurance 
firms and products.26 
In order to illustrate the impact that international organizations can 
have on the development of insurance norms, this Article will examine 
the roles played by GATS and other trade agreements, the IAIS, and the 
developing EU directives on insurance. 
A. General Agreement on Trade in Services and Other Trade Agreements 
The desire of multinational insurance companies and other financial 
services firms to access markets overseas led to the inclusion of services 
in international trade negotiations since the 1980s.27 The United States 
first addressed services in its Free Trade Agreement with Israel in 1985 
by including a nonbinding declaration on the need to develop national 
                                                                                                             
 23. OECD, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Insurance: About, 
http://www.oecd.org/about/0,3347,en_2649_34851_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 
18, 2009). 
 24. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Code for Liberalisation of Current 
Invisible Operations (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/21/2030 
182.pdf. The Invisibles Code articulates several principles, including the right of estab-
lishment of insurance, the right to provide services cross-border, and an individual’s right 
to buy insurance from any company. See id. annex A, app. to annex I, annex II. It also 
contains exceptions to preserve public order and security. Id. art. 3. The United States 
also has an exemption for any “action by a State of the United States which comes within 
the jurisdiction of that State.” Id. annex C. This exemption basically excludes state regu-
lation of insurance from compliance with this code. 
 25. See id. annex A (providing a detailed list of operations covered by the Invisibles 
Code). 
 26. About the IAA, Who Are We?, http://www.actuaries.org/index.cfm?LANG=EN& 
DSP=ABOUT&ACT=WHO (last visited Apr. 18, 2009); IASB—Insurance Contracts, 
http://www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/IASB+Projects/Insurance+Contracts/Insurance+Co
ntracts.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
 27. See Kern Alexander, The GATS and Financial Services: Liberalisation and Regu-
lation in Global Financial Markets, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND TRADE IN 
SERVICES 561, 564, 568 (Kern Alexander & Mads Andenas eds., 2008) (discussing that, 
in response to banking crises, international financial institutions sought to promote not 
only market access, but also greater financial stability through trade negotiations). 
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treatment and market access in the trade in services.28 The Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) was 
the first attempt to negotiate a multilateral agreement on services and 
resulted in GATS.29 
All of the 153 members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) are 
signatories to GATS.30 In addition, nations around the world have en-
tered into a variety of free trade agreements, like the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).31 GATS and the free trade agree-
ments are built on four principles that were originally developed to deal 
with the trade in goods under GATT: (1) national treatment, (2) most-
favored-nation status, (3) market access, and (4) transparency. National 
treatment requires that domestic rules ensure that foreign suppliers re-
ceive treatment no less favorable than domestic suppliers.32 Most-
favored-nation (“MFN”) status prohibits one country’s suppliers from 
being accorded treatment more favorable than any other nation’s suppli-
ers.33 Market access requires that nations guarantee the right of a foreign 
supplier to enter the market.34 Finally, transparency requires that rules 
regarding market access and the domestic operation of an insurance 
company be clear, ascertainable, and openly administered.35 GATS does 
not address principles or standards for prudential regulations, market 
conduct regulations, or systemic regulations for insurance.36 
                                                                                                             
 28. Free Trade Agreement, Isr.-U.S., Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 653, 679–80 (1985). 
 29. Alexander, supra note 27, at 567–69. 
 30. WTO: Understanding the WTO—Members, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto 
_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (listing the 153 WTO Members). See also Final Act Embo-
dying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, ¶ 4, Apr. 15, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (stating that, but for plurilateral agreements, the WTO 
Agreement is “open for acceptance as a whole,” including GATS). 
 31. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993); John Cooke, Alternative Approaches to Financial Services Liberalisa-
tion: The Role of Regional Trade Agreements, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND 
TRADE IN SERVICES, supra note 27, at 615, 615–34. 
 32. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XVII, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167 
[hereinafter GATS]. 
 33. Id. art. II. 
 34. Id. art. XVI. 
 35. See id. art. III. 
 36. In fact, one of the major exceptions to the applicability of the four GATS prin-
ciples is the prudential carve-out, which allows nations to adopt regulations that violate 
one or more of the four GATS principles in order to maintain the solvency of the insur-
ance industry. For a history of the prudential carve-out, see generally Wei Wang, The 
Prudential Carve-out, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND TRADE IN SERVICES, 
supra note 27, at 601, 601–04. 
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GATS and the free trade agreements allow nations to continue to apply 
laws or regulations that conflict with one or more of the four basic prin-
ciples if these laws or regulations fit within one of the following eight 
exceptions: (1) laws necessary to protect public morals or maintain pub-
lic order;37 (2) laws necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health;38 (3) laws necessary to secure compliance with other laws or reg-
ulations;39 (4) laws inconsistent with national treatment provided that the 
difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the equitable or effective 
imposition or collection of direct taxes with respect to foreign services or 
service suppliers;40 (5) laws inconsistent with MFN treatment, provided 
the difference in treatment is the result of an agreement on the avoidance 
of double taxation;41 (6) government programs not supplied on a com-
mercial basis or in competition with the private sector (e.g., health insur-
ance or unemployment insurance);42 (7) prudential measures needed to 
protect investors, policyholders, or others to whom a fiduciary duty is 
owed, or needed to stabilize the financial system;43 and (8) express reser-
vations set forth in schedules that do not conform to the obligations set 
forth in GATS.44 The breadth of these exceptions can swallow the GATS 
principles. Consequentially, whether a nation or state within the United 
States complies with these GATS principles may be a matter of soft law 
rather than hard law. For example, the United States has express reserva-
tions for many state regulations on insurance in a schedule to GATS.45 
As a result, a number of state regulations violate the GATS principles of 
national treatment, market access, and transparency.46 However, there 
does not appear to be any inconsistencies between state regulations and 
MFN status.47 
State laws that are inconsistent with the principle of national treatment 
include reinsurance cessions that differently affect domestic and out-of-
                                                                                                             
 37. GATS, supra note 32, art. XIV. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. art. XIII. 
 43. Id. Annex on Financial Services, ¶ 2(a). 
 44. See id. arts. XX–XXI. 
 45. The World Trade Organization provides a list of U.S. limitations on market 
access and national treatment in the area of insurance in its Trade in Services Database, 
http://tsdb.wto.org/Default.aspx (select “07.A. All Insurance and Insurance-related Ser-
vices” from “Jump to a specific sector for a given Member” drop-down menu; then select 
“USA” from “Choose Member” menu; then click “go”) (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
 46. Cooke & Skipper, supra note 5, at 7–16. 
 47. Id. at 14. 
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state insurers, domestic preference tax laws, and credit for reinsurance 
and collateralization.48 These collateralization obligations are particularly 
problematic when one considers that the United States accounts for al-
most half of the total reinsurance premiums worldwide.49 About thirty-
eight percent of all ceded reinsurance premiums worldwide are subject to 
the U.S. states’ requirements for collateral.50 
The states also have a number of laws or programs at odds with the 
GATS principle of market access. These include the sheer number and 
variety of insurer licensing requirements, state monopoly insurers such as 
Minnesota’s workers’ compensation reinsurer, government owned or 
sponsored insurers, compulsory or restrictive reinsurance cessions, extra-
territorial application of state laws, barriers to exit, domestic preference 
tax laws, and citizenship/residency requirements.51 While the states’ laws 
governing insurance facially meet the GATS standard of transparency, 
the large number and complexity of the insurance regulations in the fifty 
states can make the U.S. market opaque for foreign companies seeking to 
enter it.52 
In addition to these bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, the in-
surance supervisors of a number of nations have signed memoranda of 
understanding (“MOUs”) with each other. By their nature, MOUs are a 
form of soft law as they usually encourage cooperation without imposing 
any legally enforceable obligations on either party.53 The National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”), the coordinating organi-
zation for the state insurance commissioners within the United States, 
has signed MOUs regarding regulatory cooperation with the Association 
of Latin American Insurance Supervisors, Brazil, China, Egypt, Hong 
Kong, Iraq, Korea, Russia, Thailand, and Vietnam.54 While the NAIC 
can provide technical assistance on insurance regulation to other nations, 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. at 14–16. 
 49. Id. at 16. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 8–16. 
 52. Id. at 16. 
 53. See John H. McNeill, International Agreements: Recent U.S.-U.K. Practice Con-
cerning the Memorandum of Understanding, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 821, 822 (1994). 
 54. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, NAIC Signs MOU with Thailand: 
Agreement Enhances Regulatory Cooperation with Southeast Asia (June 1, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.naic.org/Releases/2008_docs/mou_thailand.htm. The language of 
these MOUs does not provide for any enforcement mechanism should one side or the 
other fail to cooperate. For example, see Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Office of the Insurance Commission, Thailand and the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners of the United States of America, available at http://www.naic.org/docu 
ments/govt_rel_mou_thailand.pdf. 
2009] INSURANCE NORMS 963 
it does not have the authority to bind any of the states in international 
negotiations on insurance standards. State insurance regulators in the 
United States are typically not authorized by state legislatures to engage 
in promoting global regulatory cooperation and might face criticism for 
wasting state money if they spend significant time on such activities.55 
B. International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
The IAIS is the primary international organization that promotes insur-
ance regulatory standards. Compared to the Basel Committee and 
IOSCO, the IAIS is a relatively new organization. It was founded in 
1994, while the Basel Committee and IOSCO are outgrowths of organi-
zations formed in 1974.56 The IAIS has over 190 members from about 
140 countries.57 It has such a large membership because the NAIC and 
each of the insurance regulators from the fifty-six U.S. jurisdictions are 
members.58 
Not every nation in the world is a member of the IAIS. Insurance su-
pervisors that “underwrite, sell or otherwise provide insurance” are not 
eligible for membership in IAIS.59 In addition, some Islamic nations have 
developed a regulatory regime for insurance that attempts to bring insur-
ance products into conformity with the requirements of Islamic law.60 
Islamic law prohibits the charging of interest (riba), contracts involving 
risk or uncertainty because one or more of the terms is undefined (gha-
rar), and gambling or speculation (maīsir).61 The requirements of Islamic 
law make it difficult to comply with the standards for conventional in-
surance being developed by the IAIS. Such differences may explain why 
                                                                                                             
 55. Cooke & Skipper, supra note 5, at 19. 
 56. About IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=history (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2009); History of the Basel Committee and Its Membership, http://www.bis. 
org/bcbs/history.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2009); IAIS—About the IAIS, http://www.iais 
web.org/index.cfm?pageID=28 (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
 57. INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, ANNUAL REPORT 2007–08 at iii, available at 
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/2007-2008_Annual_report.pdf. 
 58. Each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and each U.S. territory is a 
member of the IAIS. See IAIS Members, http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=31 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2009) (noting that the “NAIC [and fifty-six] jurisdictions” in the 
United States are IAIS members). 
 59. Int’l Ass’n of Ins. Supervisors [IAIS], By-laws, art. 6(2) (2005), available at 
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/By-laws_2005_edition.pdf. 
 60. ALY KHORSHID, ISLAMIC INSURANCE: A MODERN APPROACH TO ISLAMIC BANKING 
(2004). 
 61. Id. at 42. 
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several Islamic nations, including Indonesia, Iran, and Yemen, are not 
members of the IAIS.62 
The supervisory and regulatory agencies for nations interested in the 
Islamic financial services industry formed their own international organi-
zation in 2002, the Islamic Financial Services Board (“IFSB”).63 The 
IFSB has 178 members, “includ[ing forty-two] regulatory and supervi-
sory authorities as well as [the] International Monetary Fund, [the] 
World Bank, [the] Bank for International Settlements,” several develop-
ment banks, and about 130 market participants operating in thirty-four 
countries.64 The IFSB sets standards for regulating Islamic financial 
products, which includes banking and securities products as well as in-
surance products.65 Recognizing the need for international cooperation to 
regulate Islamic insurance providers, the IFSB and the IAIS released a 
Joint Issues Paper on Issues in Regulation and Supervision of Takaful 
(Islamic Insurance) in June 2006.66 They recently built on this effort by 
signing on December 4, 2008, a working agreement to enhance coopera-
tion between the two organizations concerning prudential regulations for 
entities that provide takaful.67 
The IAIS has issued principles, standards, and guidance papers on a 
range of insurance regulatory issues, such as capital adequacy, licensing, 
and financial conglomerates.68 The principles and standards promulgated 
by the IAIS must be approved by two-thirds of its members at a general 
meeting.69 Because of its large number of members and consensus style 
of approval for principles and standards, the IAIS principles and stan-
dards represent a floor when it comes to insurance regulation. 
The Insurance Core Principles (“ICPs”), which focus on prudential re-
quirements, form the central principles promulgated by the IAIS.70 IAIS 
members consider the ICPs as roughly equivalent to the standards set for 
                                                                                                             
 62. See IAIS Members, supra note 58. 
 63. IFSB, About IFSB, http://www.ifsb.org/background.php (last visited Mar. 17, 
2009). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Press Release, Islamic Fin. Servs. Bd., IFSB-IAIS Working Agreement Aims to 
Enhance Cooperation and Understanding in Mutual Areas of Supervision of the Takaful 
Industry (Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://www.ifsb.org/preess_full.php?id=101&sub 
mit=more. 
 67. Id. 
 68. IAIS—Overarching Standard Setting Papers, http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm? 
pageID=37 (last visited Mar. 17, 2009). 
 69. IAIS, By-laws, supra note 59, art. 12(1). 
 70. IAIS, Insurance Core Principles and Methodology (Oct. 2003), available at 
http://www.iaisweb.org/view/element_href.cfm?src=1/94.pdf. 
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banks under Basel I and Basel II. Since 2005, the IAIS has produced a 
series of policy papers to provide guidance to its members regarding how 
to implement the ICPs.71 
In 2005, the IAIS adopted two papers that outline a framework for in-
surance supervision and the cornerstone principles for insurance supervi-
sion.72 This framework divides the supervisory structure into three levels: 
Level 1—Preconditions; Level 2—Regulatory Requirements; and Level 
3—Supervisory Actions.73 The IAIS identified two preconditions for es-
tablishing an effective insurance supervisory framework: (1) an envi-
ronment that contains “developed and efficient financial market[s]” and 
an institutional and legal framework for financial services supervision; 
and (2) “clearly defined principal, supervisory objectives, and . . . a su-
pervisory authority . . . that[] has adequate powers,” is independent, is 
transparent and accountable, has sufficiently trained staff, and handles 
confidential information appropriately.74 The IAIS also identified three 
“regulatory requirements,” or areas that need to be regulated by the in-
surance supervisor. These areas are (1) financial requirements, (2) go-
vernance requirements, and (3) market conduct requirements.75 Finally, 
the IAIS discussed why supervisory assessment and intervention are crit-
ical in order to guarantee that insurers adequately deal with the risks in 
their portfolios and comply with the regulatory requirements.76 
One of the goals of the regulatory requirements is to develop a com-
mon structure and common standards for insurers’ solvency.77 In 2007, 
the IAIS published a paper outlining its views on what the common 
structure for assessing an insurer’s solvency ought to be.78 The common 
                                                                                                             
 71. IAIS—Overarching Standard Setting Papers, supra note 68. 
 72. IAIS, A New Framework for Insurance Supervision: Towards a Common Struc-
ture and Common Standards for the Assessment of Insurer Insolvency (Oct. 2005), avail-
able at http://www.iaisweb.org/view/element_href.cfm?src=1/87.pdf [herinafter IAIS, 
Framework]; IAIS, Towards a Common Structure and Common Standards for the As-
sessment of Insurer Solvency: Cornerstones for the Formulation of Regulatory Financial 
Requirements (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.iaisweb.org/view/element_href.cfm? 
src=1/88.pdf. 
 73. IAIS, Framework, supra note 72, at 5 fig.1. 
 74. Id. at 5–6. 
 75. Id. at 6. Financial requirements concern the “financial aspects of an insurer’s 
operations” including its capital adequacy and solvency. Id. Governance requirements 
concern “how an insurer is governed.” Id. Market conduct requirements concern “how an 
insurer conducts its business and presents itself to the market.” Id. 
 76. Id. at 7. 
 77. Id. 
 78. IAIS, The IAIS Common Structure for the Assessment of Insurer Solvency (Feb. 
2007), available at http://www.iaisweb.org/view/element_href.cfm?src=1/85.pdf [here-
inafter IAIS, Structure Paper]. 
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structure uses a risk-based methodology that includes both quantitative 
elements for capital adequacy and solvency, as well as qualitative ele-
ments for governance, market conduct, and disclosure.79 The common 
structure contains fifteen structure elements, which include one structure 
element at Level 1—Preconditions, twelve structure elements at Level 
2—Regulatory Requirements, one structure element at Level 3—
Supervisory Actions, and one overarching structure element concerning 
disclosure.80 The structure element for Level 1 focuses on the need for 
the insurance supervisor to have adequate power to make and enforce 
insurance regulations to assess and manage risks.81 The structure ele-
ments for Level 2 are broken down into financial requirements, market 
conduct requirements, and governance requirements.82 
Ten out of the twelve structure elements for Level 2 deal with financial 
requirements. These elements would require that solvency regulations 
address all relevant risks, “including underwriting risk, credit risk, mar-
ket risk, operational risk[,] and liquidity risk.”83 The elements require 
quantifiable risks to be addressed “in sufficiently risk sensitive regulato-
ry financial requirements.”84 Such requirements should “provide . . . in-
centives for optimal alignment of risk management by the insurer and 
[the] regulation.”85 The IAIS does not mandate that insurance supervisors 
use one method for achieving this goal. Instead, the IAIS Structure Paper 
notes that insurance supervisors may use any of the following methods: 
• regulatory financial requirements, ranging from sophisticated risk 
sensitive requirements to simple ratios or even nominal minimum re-
quirements including necessary safety measures 
• quantitative limits to risk exposures 
• qualitative requirements 
• additional quantitative or qualitative requirements arising from super-
visory assessment.86 
Nevertheless, the IAIS envisions the insurer’s responsibility as manag-
ing risk and the insurance regulator’s responsibility as guaranteeing that 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. at 4. 
 80. Id. at 5–9. 
 81. Id. at 5. 
 82. Id. at 5–8. 
 83. Id. at 5. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 16. 
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the insurer meets this obligation.87 Thus, the IAIS encourages supervisors 
to require that an insurer “translate its risk exposure as far as practicable 
into quantitative measures which provide a sound and consistent basis for 
the setting of premium levels, determining technical provisions and de-
ciding on the economic capital it finds optimal from its risk management 
perspective.”88 IAIS standards would allow supervisors to give individual 
insurers a great deal of latitude in terms of assessing and reserving for 
the risks they face. In fact, the IAIS believes that such risk-sensitive reg-
ulatory requirements are preferable to fixed ratios or limits because they 
provide insurers with better incentives for managing risk, discourage 
regulatory arbitrage, and enable the better use of resources.89 
IAIS structure elements for Financial Requirements also encourage in-
surance supervisors and insurers to use the “total balance sheet ap-
proach” when assessing risks.90 This approach is meant to be consistent 
with the total balance sheet approach adopted by the IAA.91 The IAIS’s 
approach “recogni[z]e[s] the interdependence [of an insurer’s] assets, 
liabilities, capital requirements, and capital resources.”92 At a minimum, 
the IAIS expects the total assets of an insurer minus the total liabilities of 
an insurer to “exceed the [insurer’s] required capital for solvency pur-
poses.”93 The IAIS’s structure elements call for basing the valuation of 
an insurer’s assets and liabilities on their current economic value consis-
tent with their current market prices.94 The IAIS recognizes that all in-
surance assets and liabilities may not be traded on deep, liquid markets 
and that mark-to-model methodologies will need to be used to estimate 
their economic value in those cases.95 
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. at 14. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 16–17. 
 90. Id. at 19. 
 91. The IAA articulated its concept of total balance sheet approach in A Global 
Framework for Insurer Solvency Assessment, in which it noted: “an insurer’s true finan-
cial strength for solvency purposes requires appraisal of its total balance sheet on an inte-
grated basis under a system that depends upon realistic values, consistent treatment of 
both assets and liabilities and does not generate a hidden surplus or deficit.” INT’L AC-
TUARIAL ASS’N, INSURER SOLVENCY ASSESSMENT WORKING PARTY, A GLOBAL FRAME-
WORK FOR INSURER SOLVENCY ASSESSMENT (2004), available at http://www.actuaries. 
org/LIBRARY/papers/global_framework_insurer_solvency_assessment-public.pdf. 
 92. IAIS, Structure Paper, supra note 78, at 19. 
 93. Id. at 19. 
 94. Id. at 19–20. 
 95. Id. at 20–22. 
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IAIS rules only require that the risk margin,96 and not the service mar-
gin,97 be taken into account when calculating technical provisions and 
other insurance liabilities. This approach conflicts with the approach rec-
ommended by the IASB. The IASB expects insurers to measure their 
liabilities based on three factors: 
(a) explicit, unbiased, market-consistent, probability-weighted and cur-
rent estimates of the contractual cash flows[;] 
(b) current market discount rates that adjust the estimated future cash 
flows for the time value of money[;] 
(c) an explicit and unbiased estimate of the margin that market partici-
pants require for bearing risk (a risk margin) and for providing other 
services, if any (a service margin).98 
As a result, liabilities for solvency purposes under the IAIS approach 
are lower than liabilities for accounting purposes under the IASB ap-
proach. Many state insurance regulators in the United States require that 
the service margin also be taken into account when estimating technical 
provisions and other liabilities. Some in the European Union have op-
posed including a service margin because they feel that it falls outside of 
the market value for insurance liabilities.99 The IAIS standards more 
closely reflect the European approach rather than the American approach 
or the IASB approach. 
IAIS structure elements provide that capital requirements for an insurer 
must take into account not only the level of liabilities, including the risk 
margin for those liabilities, but also asset-liability mismatch risk and vo-
latility risks. For some countries adopting the IAIS standards would re-
sult in substantial changes in their solvency regulations for insurance 
companies. Below is an example of how the valuing of assets and liabili-
ties under a traditional formula-based solvency approach would differ 
from the market-consistent approach advocated by the IAIS: 
  
                                                                                                             
 96. Risk margin reflects the estimated margin required for insurers to bear risks. 
 97. Service margin reflects the estimated margin required for insurers to perform 
services other than bearing the risk of loss. 
 98. INT’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., DISCUSSION PAPER: PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS 11 (May 2007), available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/ 
08C8BB09-61B7-4BE8-AA39-A1F71F665135/0/InsurancePart1.pdf. 
 99. The EU Solvency II proposal does not include a service margin when calculating 
the value of technical provisions and other liabilities. 
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Most nations around the world do not yet regulate insurance company 
solvency using the risk-based approach advocated by the IAIS in its 
Structure Paper. The European Union has proposed a regulatory regime 
called Solvency II which would be very similar to the one espoused by 
the IAIS.100 The states within the United States, however, use a combina-
tion of “formula-based minimum reserves and factor-based minimum 
capital requirements” that have been adjusted in recent years to include 
some risk-based modeling approaches.101 The NAIC adopted a Solvency 
Modernization Initiative Work Plan to examine to what extent U.S. in-
surance regulations will need to change in response to IAIS principles or 
other developments around the world, such as the EU Solvency II pro-
posal.102 
The failure of American International Group (“AIG”) and the U.S. in-
vestment banks to predict accurately the risks to which they were  
exposed based on their internal models has raised doubts about the effec-
tiveness of current risk management models, and the use of mark-to-
                                                                                                             
 100. Solvency II: Setting a Global Standard, REACTIONS, Jul/Aug 2008. See also Euro-
pean Commission, Internal Market, Insurance, Basic Architecture, http://ec.europa.eu/int 
ernal_market/insurance/solvency/architecture_en.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (de-
scribing Solvency II). 
 101. Andrew F. Griffin & Mike Lombardi, Financial Services: Toward a Global Sol-
vency Standard, EMPHASIS 2006/2, at 20, available at http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/ 
getwebcachedoc?webc=TILL/USA/2006/200605/SolvenyQ2523.pdf. 
 102. Solvency II: Setting a Global Standard, supra note 100; NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS, PLEN. SESS. MINUTES NAIC “SOLVENCY MODERNIZATION INITIATIVE” WORK 
PLAN (June 2, 2008), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_080 
903_solvency_2_work_plan.pdf. 
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market accounting practices.103 The concerns raised by the current global 
financial crisis led the G20 Summit to establish two working groups that 
would deal with issues related to insurance—one to re-evaluate the regu-
latory requirements for insurers and the other to enhance international 
cooperation.104 The IAIS has set up a task force to examine what changes 
need to be made to deal with international insurers and the special risks 
they pose, what prudential requirements to impose to deal with contagion 
effects from failing firms, what regulations should be developed to deal 
with currently unregulated entities, and how to achieve regulatory consis-
tency with other sectors like banking and securities.105 As a result of 
these investigations, IAIS solvency standards and other regulatory stan-
dards are likely to be revised in the near future. 
C. European Union Directives 
The European Union represents the single biggest market for insur-
ance, as it generates thirty-seven percent of the worldwide premiums.106 
As a result, its laws and regulations play a large role in shaping the stan-
dards by which insurance companies operate worldwide. The EU is in 
                                                                                                             
 103. Pursuant to the congressional requirement in the Emergency Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 2008, the SEC issued a report in December on the impact of mark-to-market 
accounting in the current financial crisis. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF 
ACCOUNTANT, DIV. ON CORP. FIN., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 133 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: STUDY ON 
MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING (Dec. 30, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf. This report concluded that mark-to-market ac-
counting had not played a significant role in the current crisis and that the benefits to 
investors from the transparency provided by mark-to-market accounting outweighed any 
costs associated with the practice. Id. at 7–8. The report did make some recommendations 
about how fair value and mark-to-market accounting could be improved. Id. at 7–10. This 
report, however, has not halted the ongoing debate about whether mark-to-market ac-
counting contributed to the current financial crisis. Even before the current financial cri-
sis began, some academics raised the possibility that mark-to-market accounting might 
cause a financial crisis when one would not have occurred using traditional accounting. 
For example, see Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, Mark-to-Market Accounting and Li-
quidity Pricing (Fin. Inst. Ctr., Wharton Sch. of Bus., Univ. of Pa., No. 06-15, 2006), 
available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/06/0615.pdf. 
 104. G20, About G20, http://www.g20.org/about_working_groups.aspx (last visited Apr. 
23, 2009) (listing all four working groups). In its response to the G20 Washington Action 
Plan, the IAIS has identified pertinent “action items” for the insurance industry that the 
working groups should address. INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, IAIS FOLLOW-UP RE-
SPONSE TO THE G20 WASHINGTON ACTION PLAN 1, 7 (Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www. 
iaisweb.org/__temp/IAIS_follow-up_response_to_G20__February_2009.pdf [hereinafter 
IAIS FOLLOW-UP RESPONSE]. 
 105. IAIS FOLLOW-UP RESPONSE, supra note 104, at 3. 
 106. Cooke & Skipper, supra note 5, at 3. 
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the process of adopting Solvency II, a new insurance directive defining 
the framework principles for insurance regulation within the European 
Union.107 Implementation of Solvency II involves a four-step process.108 
The first level focuses on the adoption of the primary legislation that will 
define these framework principles.109 The second level requires the 
Commission, with the assistance of a regulatory committee and an advi-
sory committee, to adopt the technical measures for implementing these 
principles.110 The third level requires cooperation among the national 
regulators within the EU to ensure the consistent interpretation of the 
rules and regulations implementing the framework principles.111 Finally, 
the fourth level requires consistent enforcement of the rules.112 
Like Basel II, Solvency II envisions organizing the framework prin-
ciples around three pillars.113 Pillar I would define the financial require-
ments including the capital adequacy and solvency requirements for in-
surance firms.114 Pillar II would define the supervisory activities of each 
national authority.115 Pillar III would outline the reporting and public dis-
closure requirements for insurance firms and supervisory authorities.116 
As in Basel II and the IAIS solvency structure, Solvency II would re-
define the capital adequacy requirements to allow firms to use risk mod-
els to more accurately determine their exposure to risk and the capital 
necessary to maintain their solvency. Solvency II would employ two cri-
teria: the Solvency Capital Requirement (“SCR”) and the Minimum Cap-
ital Requirement (“MCR”).117 Under the SCR, firms would be allowed to 
use either a standard form based on different models approved by their 
national supervisory authority or their own internal models after getting 
them approved by their national supervisory authority.118 The MCR 
                                                                                                             
 107. See European Commission, Internal Market, Insurance, Solvency and Solvency 
II, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/solvency/index_en.htm#sol2 (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2009). 
 108. UK Financial Services Authority, Solvency 2, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/ 
About/What/International/solvency/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. RYM AYADI & CHRISTOPHER O’BRIEN, THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION 
AND SUPERVISION IN THE EU: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, NEW CHALLENGES: FINAL REPORT OF 
A CEPS TASK FORCE 66–69 (2006). 
 114. Id. at 66–67. 
 115. Id. at 66, 69. 
 116. Id. at 67, 69. 
 117. Id. at 67. 
 118. Id. at 68. 
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would be set by the national supervisory authorities and would act as a 
floor in terms of capital adequacy. If a firm fell below the MCR, it would 
trigger supervisory action.119 The EU may reconsider which models it 
will allow firms to use and may set higher MCR standards in the wake of 
the current financial crisis. 
Solvency II will likely influence how insurance regulators outside of 
the EU regulate insurance, particularly those in the United States. This is 
due to the fact that many multinational insurance companies operate in 
the EU and may want the standards that apply in the EU to apply to their 
global operations. In addition, Solvency II would require that non-EU 
insurance companies be regulated by a supervisory authority equivalent 
to the national authorities within the EU in order to allow their capital 
held outside of the EU to be counted towards meeting their capital re-
quirements under Solvency II.120 It is unclear at this time if U.S. state 
regulators would be deemed “equivalent” under Solvency II or to what 
extent they would have to change their laws and regulations to be 
deemed “equivalent.” Thus, Solvency II may pressure U.S. regulators to 
adopt the same or similar standards for regulating insurance so that U.S. 
insurance companies with international operations are not handicapped 
when they try to compete in the Europe Union. 
II. THE U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE AS AN OBSTACLE TO 
DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
As the United States is the largest single national insurance market in 
the world, the way it regulates insurance has a significant impact on the 
global standards for insurance regulation. The inability of the Unites 
States to establish uniform standards domestically hinders its ability to 
persuade other nations to adopt uniform standards internationally.121 In 
addition, the U.S. approach to regulating insurance currently makes it 
difficult for it to engage in the type of give-and-take necessary to conduct 
successful international negotiations.122 To better comprehend why the 
U.S. regulatory structure hinders the development of international norms, 
one needs to understand how the United States ended up with its current 
regulatory structure and the problems with this structure. 
                                                                                                             
 119. Id. 
 120. Commission Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Taking-up and Pursuit of Business of Insurance and Reinsurance 
(Solvency II), at 26, COM(2008) 119 final (Feb. 26, 2008). 
 121. Cooke & Skipper, supra note 5, at 18–19. See also id. at 22–23 (noting that an 
optional federal charter would help alleviate this problem). 
 122. Id. at 18–19. 
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A. Brief History of the U.S. Regulatory Structure 
Historically, U.S. federal and state governments have regulated finan-
cial services primarily based on the institution providing the financial 
service or product. This type of regulation is referred to as institutional or 
entity regulation.123 The states established separate regulators to regulate 
first banks, then insurance companies, and finally securities firms. 
States began regulating insurance during the latter half of the 1800s. 
The first state board established to regulate insurance was the New 
Hampshire Board of Insurance Commissioners formed in 1851.124 “In 
1873, [only] twelve states had ‘some form of institutionalized insurance 
regulation’”; by 1905, twenty-two states had such regulation.125 State 
insurance regulation during this period was not exactly effective, in part, 
due to the fact that many administrators were either corrupt, halfhearted, 
or ineffectual.126 In addition, no coherent economic theory underlay most 
insurance regulation. Instead, most regulations were a product of interest 
group politics, policyholders’ fears concerning the economic power of 
the insurance companies, and a belief that such companies were out to 
defraud the public.127 
State regulations have never been completely consistent or uniform. In 
fact, as the insurance companies expanded across state lines, some within 
the industry sought federal regulation as a means of supplanting the bur-
den of complying with different state regulations.128 It was presumed that 
federal regulation would be weaker than the existing state regulations.129 
Movement in the direction of federal regulation was halted by the deci-
sion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Paul v. Virginia,130 which held that 
“[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce” and, 
therefore, the federal government lacked the power to regulate insurance 
under the Commerce Clause.131 In 1944, however, the U.S. Supreme 
Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n reversed its 
                                                                                                             
 123. Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States 
Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2005). 
 124. Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism 
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 625, 
630 n.18 (1999). Many of the first commissions were not independent agencies or enti-
ties, but were instead comprised of other state officials with other duties. LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 332 (3d ed., 2005). 
 125. FRIEDMAN, supra note 124. 
 126. Id. at 333. 
 127. Id. at 331–33. 
 128. Randall, supra note 124, at 630. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 169 (1868). 
 131. Id. at 183. 
974 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
earlier decision in Paul v. Virginia.132 This time the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that insurance did constitute interstate commerce and was subject to 
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.133 
In spite of the decision in South-Eastern Underwriters, insurance was 
the only area of the financial services industry that did not come under at 
least partial federal regulation as an element of the New Deal.134 This 
was due largely to the efforts of the NAIC. The NAIC, a voluntary body 
comprised of the insurance commissioners from all of the states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and the U.S. territories, viewed the decision in South-
Eastern Underwriters as an assault on the states’ power to regulate in-
surance and proposed a bill to reserve this power to the states.135 The bill 
was enacted in 1945 as the McCarran-Ferguson Act,136 and stated that 
federal law would not regulate insurance activities, provided those activi-
ties were (1) related to the “business of insurance,” (2) regulated by state 
law, and (3) not designed to intimidate, coerce, or boycott.137 The NAIC 
drafted model laws governing insurance with the All-Industry Commit-
tee, a group of insurance industry representatives organized by the 
NAIC, and worked to ensure that most of the states had adopted these 
laws by the early 1950s.138 
In the 1960s, the insolvencies of several property-liability insurers 
sparked an interest to regulate insurance at the federal level.139 Senator 
Edward Brooke, a Republican from Massachusetts, proposed the Federal 
Insurance Act, which would have allowed insurers to seek either a feder-
al or a state charter.140 Congress did not enact this proposal. Instead, in 
1969, the NAIC proposed model legislation for state guaranty funds.141 
By 1982, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had 
adopted some form of state guaranty fund legislation, although not all of 
                                                                                                             
 132. See United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 552–53 (1944). 
 133. Id. 
 134. SHEILA BAIR, UNIV. OF MASS. ISENBERG SCH. OF MGMT., CONSUMER RAMIFI-
CATIONS OF AN OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTER FOR LIFE INSURERS 6–9 (2004), available at 
http://www.isenberg.umass.edu/finopmgt/uploads/textWidget/2494.00004/documents/bai
r-cons-ramifications.pdf [hereinafter BAIR, MASSACHUSETTS STUDY]; Randall, supra note 
124, at 633–34. 
 135. Randall, supra note 124, at 629, 633. 
 136. Ch. 20, § 1, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §1011 (2004)). 
 137. Randall, supra note 124, at 633–34. 
 138. Id. at 634. 
 139. BAIR, MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 7. 
 140. Id. at 7. See also Federal Insurance Act, S. 1710, 95th Cong. (1977). 
 141. BAIR, MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 7; III—Insolvencies/Guaranty 
Funds, http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/insolvencies/ (last visited Mar. 27, 
2009). 
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these laws followed the NAIC model act.142 The Federal Insurance Act 
bill was not the last time that the insurance sector faced the threat of fed-
eral regulation of insurance. 
The federal government began regulating employer-sponsored retire-
ment plans, and medical, life, and disability insurance following the 
enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) 
in 1974.143 ERISA’s requirements supersede any other applicable state 
insurance requirements. ERISA is administered through the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a federal agency that provides insurance 
to guarantee future pension payments.144 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, several insurance company bankruptcies 
prompted renewed interest in federal regulation of insurance.145 In 1990, 
a report by the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of 
the Committee on Energy and Commerce found that the existing state 
regulations regarding insurance company solvency were inadequate.146 
Representative John Dingell, a Democrat from Michigan, proposed creat-
ing a dual system for insurance company solvency regulation, including 
the creation of a federal guaranty fund for federally chartered insurance 
companies.147 This proposal also failed to be enacted after the NAIC and 
                                                                                                             
 142. III—Insolvencies/Guaranty Funds, supra note 141. For example, New York’s law 
uses a pre-assessment or pre-insolvency method for raising the necessary financing to pay 
off claims rather than the post-assessment or post-insolvency method proposed in the 
NAIC model act. Id. Under the New York law, the guaranty fund requires each insurance 
company to pay an amount into the fund based on a percentage of the net direct pre-
miums written by the company during the year, and these funds are held to pay off future 
claims that may arise if an insurance company becomes insolvent. Under the NAIC mod-
el act, the state guaranty fund does not make any assessments until an insurance company 
becomes insolvent and then only assesses the amount needed from the other insurance 
companies to pay the claims of the insolvent company’s policyholders. In addition, the 
NAIC model act does not create a state guaranty fund for annuities, life, disability, acci-
dent and health, surety, ocean marine, mortgage guaranty, and title insurance, but some 
state guaranty funds do cover claims against companies that write these types of insur-
ance. See id. 
 143. BAIR, MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 7. 
 144. KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF IN-
SURANCE 39 (1988). 
 145. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 
1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 15 
(1993). 
 146. BAIR, MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 8. See also STAFF OF H. COMM. 
ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, 101ST CONG., 
FAILED PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES (Comm. Print 1990). The report 
is also known as the “Dingell Report,” after Representative John Dingell, a Democrat 
from Michigan. BAIR, MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 8 
 147. BAIR, MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 8. 
976 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
the many states adopted “risk-based capital requirements [for insurers 
similar to the banking requirements], a financial regulation accreditation 
program, and an initiative to codify statutory accounting principles.”148 
As a result of the decline in profitability of commercial banking, com-
mercial banks sought to expand their products and services into more 
profitable financial services.149 Beginning in 1983 with South Dakota, 
many states liberalized the rules governing state banks, permitting them 
to carry on insurance activities.150 In 1991, Congress adopted the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act,151 which prohibited 
banks from engaging in insurance underwriting even if permitted under 
state law.152 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) in 
the U.S. Treasury Department through an interpretative release allowed 
national banks to sell annuities and to act as insurance agents if located 
in a town with less than 5000 residents.153 
In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”),154 
which repealed portions of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933,155 the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956,156 and other laws in order to permit 
banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other entities engaged 
in the provision of financial services to form financial conglomerates157 
                                                                                                             
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Martin E. Lybecker, The “South Dakota” Experience and the Bush Task Group’s 
Report: Reconciling Perceived Overlaps in the Dual Regulation of Banking, 53 BROOK. 
L. REV. 71, 72 (1987). 
 151. Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 303, 105 Stat. 2236, 2350 (codified in 12 U.S.C.S. § 
1831a). 
 152. Id. § 303(a). 
 153. Interpretive Letter No. 753, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Letter 
Approving First Union National Banks Notification of Intent to Establish Operating 
Subsidiaries to Engage in Insurance Activities (Nov. 4, 1976), available at http://www.occ. 
treas.gov/interp/nov/int753.htm. See also 12 C.F.R. § 7.1001 (2009). 
 154. Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 1, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 
12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.). 
 155. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). The Glass-Steagall Act is the name given to four 
sections of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1933). The GLBA repealed sec-
tion 20 of Glass-Steagall, which prevented any Federal Reserve member bank from affi-
liating with an entity principally engaged in securities, and section 33, which banned 
interlocking managements between Federal Reserve member banks and securities firms. 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 101, 12 U.S.C. §§ 377–78 (1999). 
 156. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–49). 
 157. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Joint Forum on Financial 
Conglomerates define financial conglomerates as “any group of companies under com-
mon control whose exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing significant 
services in at least two different financial sectors.” TRIPARTITE GROUP OF BANK, SEC. & 
INS. REGULATORS, THE SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES ¶ 36 (July 1995), 
2009] INSURANCE NORMS 977 
that would enable them to cross-sell each other’s products and services. 
With the GLBA, Congress essentially ratified the movement away from 
institutional regulation towards functional regulation and the dismantling 
of the barriers among banks, securities firms, and insurance companies 
that rulemaking by the existing state and federal financial service regula-
tory agencies had already begun to undertake.158 
Functional regulation focuses on the products or services being of-
fered, rather than the institution offering them, to determine which regu-
lator ought to regulate the products or services.159 For example, under the 
GLBA, Congress envisioned the SEC regulating investments in securi-
ties regardless of whether the investment services were offered through a 
bank or through an independent brokerage firm. Within the institutional 
regulatory regime, banking regulators traditionally regulated securities 
offered through banks.160 
This movement away from institutional regulation under the GLBA, 
however, did not occur in the area of insurance. Congress left insurance 
regulation primarily in the hands of the state insurance commissions. 
Section 104 of the GLBA reaffirmed that the states would retain control 
over the regulation of insurance products and services.161 The GLBA did 
put a few limitations on the otherwise unfettered ability of the states to 
regulate insurance. For example, GLBA Section 104(c) prohibits states 
from preventing or restricting a depository institution or an affiliate of 
such institution from being affiliated with any person except in certain 
limited circumstances related to insurers.162 The GLBA still permits 
                                                                                                             
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs20.pdf?noframes=1. This Article will use this 
definition when referring to financial conglomerates. Financial conglomerates are distin-
guishable from “mixed conglomerates,” in which groups of commercial or industrial 
enterprises include a financial institution as part of their structure. Id. While mixed con-
glomerates may raise some of the same regulatory and supervisory issues as financial 
conglomerates, such concerns are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 158. See Brown, supra note 123, at 10–25. 
 159. Id. at 11. 
 160. Originally, sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
excluded banks from the definitions of broker and dealer and left the regulation of banks 
engaging in securities activities to the banking regulators. Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 §§ 3(a)(4)–(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4)–(5) (1998). The GLBA amended those sec-
tions to eliminate the exception for banks. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 201–02. If a 
bank’s securities activities do not fall into one of the other categories of permissible bank 
securities activities set forth in the GLBA, then the bank is required to transfer those bro-
ker-dealer activities to an affiliated broker-dealer. 
 161. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 104. 
 162. Id. § 104(c). Prior to the GLBA’s enactment, nine states and one territory 
prohibited banks from affiliating with insurance companies. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK 
SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED BANKING 117–19 (17th ed. 1998). Those 
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states to collect, review, and take actions (including approval or disap-
proval) on applications that concern the proposed acquisition, change in 
control, or continued control of an insurer domiciled in the state; that 
require a person seeking to acquire control of an insurer to maintain or 
restore the insurer’s capital requirements under the state’s capital regula-
tions, or that restrict the change in control in the ownership of stock of 
the insurer, or a company formed for the purpose of controlling the in-
surer, after the insurer has converted from a mutual to a stock form, so 
long as such restrictions do not discriminate against depository institu-
tions or their affiliates.163 
The GLBA also required states to establish uniform or reciprocal re-
quirements for licensing of insurance agents within three years after the 
enactment of the act.164 The GLBA mandated that the NAIC had to de-
termine whether a majority of states had to meet this requirement.165 If 
NAIC was unable to do so, then the National Association of Registered 
Agents and Brokers (“NARAB”) would be established as a nonprofit 
corporation to act as a mechanism through which “uniform licensing, 
appointment, continuing education, and other insurance producer sales 
qualification requirements and conditions” could be adopted.166 
Perhaps not surprisingly, when given a choice between reciprocity and 
uniformity, the states chose reciprocity.167 Reciprocity only requires that 
states accept the licensing decisions of other states, even though their 
requirements might be different, while uniformity would have required 
states to apply the same set of licensing requirements. Currently, the 
                                                                                                             
states and territory were Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, New York, Puerto Rico, 
Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id. 
 163. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 104(c)(2). The GLBA also preserves the rights of 
states to restrict certain insurance activities by depository institutions or insurers licensed 
in the state regardless of where they are domiciled. Id. § 104(d). In the event of a dispute 
between federal and state insurance regulators, the GLBA provides a dispute resolution 
mechanism under which either regulator is permitted to seek expedited review from the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or the state’s proper U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Id. § 304. See also 15 U.S.C. 6714 (2004). 
 164. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 321. See also 15 U.S.C. 6751. 
 165. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 304. See also 15 U.S.C. 6714. 
 166. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 322–23. See also 15 U.S.C. 6752–53. 
 167. Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises, Comm. on Financial Serv., H. of Rep., State Insurance Regula-
tion: Efforts to Streamline Key Licensing and Approval Processes Face Challenges, at 2 
(June 18, 2002) (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director, Financial Markets and Com-
munity Investment, General Accounting Office) [hereinafter Hillman Testimony]. 
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NAIC has certified forty-three states as meeting the reciprocity require-
ments under the GLBA.168 
Nevertheless, major states, like California, Florida, and New York, still 
have not complied with the reciprocity requirements.169 The major stum-
bling blocks against reciprocity among all fifty states concern finger-
printing and surplus lines bond requirements for nonresident producers, 
which are considered important consumer protection issues in the states 
that require them, particularly California and Florida.170 
Finally, the GLBA permits banks, securities firms, insurance compa-
nies, and other entities engaged in financial services to become affiliated 
under the umbrella of a financial holding company (“FHC”) and allowed 
these firms to cross-sell each other’s products.171 The GLBA designated 
the Federal Reserve, which supervises bank holding companies, to be-
come the supervisor for the FHCs, although the financial subsidiaries of 
the FHCs would continue to be regulated by the relevant authority for 
their product or service.172 The Act also specifies that FHCs and their 
subsidiaries may engage in certain activities that are financial in nature, 
including securities underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting, 
insurance agency activities, and merchant banking.173 An FHC also may 
engage in any activity that the Federal Reserve, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, determines to be financial in nature, incidental 
to finance, or complementary to a financial activity, provided that such 
activity does not pose a substantial risk to the safety and soundness of the 
FHC.174 
The number of domestic FHCs declined from 612 in 2003, to 597 in 
2007.175 The vast majority of the companies registered as FHCs were 
                                                                                                             
 168. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, PRODUCER LICENSING ASSESSMENT AGGREGATE 
REPORT OF FINDINGS 2 (2008), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/2008_docs/ 
producer_licensing_assessment_report.pdf [hereinafter NAIC, RECIPROCITY REPORT]. 
 169. See id. n.1. 
 170. See id. exhibit A, at 3–4 (finding that background checks and surplus lines bonds 
are “inconsistent with the reciprocity requirements under GLBA”). 
 171. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103(a). 
 172. Id. § 113 For example, an insurance company owned by an FHC would still be 
subject to state insurance regulators. 
 173. Id. § 103. For certain financial activities, FHCs may be subject to joint regulation 
by the Federal Reserve and another regulatory authority. See id. §§ 112–13. 
 174. Id. § 103. 
 175. INS. INFO. INST. & FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT 
BOOK 2009, at 45 (2009). 
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bank holding companies before the enactment of the GLBA.176 Only a 
few insurance firms that were not previously affiliated with a commercial 
bank before the enactment of GLBA elected to become FHCs.177 MetLife 
falls into this category.178 Many of the largest financial conglomerates 
with substantial insurance businesses have not registered as FHCs, in-
cluding AIG, because insurance firms were not subject to the limitations 
on affiliations that banking firms were subject to before the adoption of 
the GLBA.179 
Just because insurance companies are not registering as FHCs does not 
mean that they are engaging in a limited range of financial services. For 
example, before the current financial crisis began, thirty-four insurance 
companies, including AIG, entered into banking-related activities by ac-
quiring thrifts.180 In the wake of the enactment of the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 2008, several other insurance companies ac-
quired thrifts in order to become eligible under the Act to receive funds 
as thrift holding companies from the Capital Purchase Program and the 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation.181 The Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) in the 
                                                                                                             
 176. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES UNDER THE GRAMM-
LEACH-BLILEY ACT 3 (2003). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See FRB: Financial Holding Companies as of March 27, 2009, www.federalreserve. 
gov/generalinfo/fhc/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2009). In fact, only one of the top five compa-
nies classified as diversified financials by Fortune in 2007 has registered as FHCs. Id. 
Steve Bartlett, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Financial Services 
Roundtable, commented in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs on July 13, 2004: 
One of the central features of GLBA was the creation of financial holding 
companies. . . . The financial holding company structure significantly expanded 
the scope of activities permissible for banking firms; it did not offer insurance 
firms and securities firms a similar benefit. Outside of the financial holding 
company structure, securities and insurance firms are subject to few limitations 
on affiliations. Thus, it is not surprising that only a handful of securities and in-
surance firms have become financial holding companies. 
Testimony to the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the U.S. S., at 8 (July 
13, 2004) (statement of Steve Bartlett, President and Chief Executive Officer, Financial 
Services Roundtable). 
 180. INS. INFO. INST. & FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT 
BOOK 2006, at 58–59 (2006) (listing thirty-four insurance companies that acquired thrifts). 
 181. News Bulletin, Morrison & Foerster, Insurance Companies Adopt Thrift Holding 
Company Structure to Become Eligible for Treasury Capital Purchase Program and FDIC 
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U.S. Treasury Department, not the Federal Reserve, acts as the primary 
regulator for thrift holding companies that own a federally chartered 
thrift.182 The near bankruptcy of AIG has raised questions about whether 
the OTS is equipped to regulate complex financial conglomerates.183 
The fact that financial conglomerates can gain access to bailout funds 
by either becoming a bank holding company or a thrift holding company 
undermines the intent of the GLBA that financial conglomerates should 
become FHCs and be regulated by the Federal Reserve. Congress may 
need to reconsider who regulates financial conglomerates at the federal 
level and how regulations can be harmonized to prevent firms like AIG 
from engaging in regulatory arbitrage to find the weakest regulator. 
B. State Efforts at Uniformity 
Attempts by Congress, the NAIC, and elements within the insurance 
industry to encourage uniform state insurance regulations have not prov-
en particularly successful. The states cannot agree on the most basic is-
sues, such as a uniform definition for insurance. Several states do not 
even try to define insurance in their statutes.184 In these states, one must 
look to state common law for a definition.185 
In states that do define insurance or a contract of insurance in their sta-
tutes, many of the definitions are short and cryptic. The California Insur-
ance Code, for example, defines insurance as “a contract whereby one 
undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising 
from a contingent or unknown event.”186 This definition is extremely 
broad and could encompass a variety of other financial services products. 
Guaranties, warranties, suretyships, indorsements, pledges, mortgages, 
conditional sales, indemnity, and insurance all have the common purpose 
of protecting someone from the harms of possible future events.187 Not 
all of these products, however, are regulated by state insurance commis-
sioners. Other states employ longer, but not necessarily more useful, de-
finitions in their statutes. New York defines an insurance contract as 
                                                                                                             
Liquidity Guarantee (Nov. 23, 2008), available at http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/ 
files/081123Insurance.pdf. 
 182. Office of Thrift Supervision—About the ORT, http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=About 
OTS (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
 183. Jeff Gerth, Was AIG Watchdog not up to the Job?, PROPUBLICA, Nov. 10, 2008, 
http://www.propublica.org/feature/was-aig-watchdog-not-up-to-the-job. 
 184. ERIC M. HOLMES & JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, 2d § 
1.3 (2008). 
 185. Id. 
 186. CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (Deering 2008). 
 187. HOLMES & APPLEMAN, supra note 184. 
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any agreement or other transaction whereby one party, the “insurer”, is 
obligated to confer benefit of pecuniary value upon another party, the 
“insured” or “beneficiary”, dependent upon the happening of a fortuit-
ous event in which the insured or beneficiary has, or is expected to 
have at the time of such happening, a material interest which will be 
adversely affected by the happening of such event.188 
New York further defines a fortuitous event as “any occurrence or fail-
ure to occur which is, or is assumed by the parties to be, to a substantial 
extent beyond the control of either party.”189 
Given these differences in how insurance is defined, states sometimes 
disagree over whether a particular product should be regulated as insur-
ance, securities, or banking products. State insurance supervisors have 
contemplated regulating certain derivatives as insurance even though 
these products are frequently treated as falling within the regulatory 
scope of securities or futures regulators.190 Derivatives cover a wide 
range of products. These products essentially involve an agreement, op-
tion, or instrument that requires the buyer to take delivery or assume a 
specified amount of one or more underlying interests, or that has a price, 
performance, value, or cash flow based primarily upon the actual or ex-
pected price, level, performance, value, or cash flow of one or more un-
derlying interests.191 Derivatives include options, futures, swaps, war-
rants, hedges, and securitizations.192 The sellers use these transactions to 
reduce their risks due to changes in price, performance, value, or cash 
flow of the underlying interests. 
Derivatives are often used as substitutes for insurance regardless of 
whether they are regulated as insurance.193 Credit default swaps, weather 
                                                                                                             
 188. NY INS. LAW § 1101(a)(1) (Consol. 2008). 
 189. Id. § 1101(a)(2). 
 190. See, e.g., JAN JOB DE VRIES ROBBÉ & PAUL U. ALI, SECURITISATION OF DERIVA-
TIVES AND ALTERNATIVE ASSET CLASSES: YEARBOOK 2005, at 82 (2005) (discussing the 
draft NAIC White Paper recommending that weather derivatives be regulated as insur-
ance even though the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the Weather Risk 
Management Association, and the Bond Markets Association preferred that they be 
treated as securities or futures). 
 191. KEITH REDHEAD, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO FUTURES, 
FORWARDS, OPTIONS AND SWAPS 1–3 (1997). 
 192. Id. at 1. 
 193. For a fuller discussion of some of these instruments, see Tamar Frankel & Joseph 
W. LaPlume, Securitizing Insurance Risks, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 203 (2000); Peter 
Carayannopoulos, Paul Kovacs & Darrell Leadbetter, Insurance Securitization: Cata-
strophic Event Exposure and the Role of Insurance Linked Securities in Addressing Risk 
(ICLR Research Paper Series No. 27, 2003), available at http://www.iclr.org/pdf/securi 
tization.pdf; J. David Cummins, CAT Bonds and Other Risk-Linked Securities: State of 
the Market and Recent Developments (Temple Univ., 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
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derivatives, real estate hedges, and insurance securitization in the form of 
asset-backed bonds all function like insurance.194 The market for credit 
default swaps has exploded in the past decade, reaching almost $62 tril-
lion in 2008.195 Credit default swaps have avoided regulation because 
they have been deemed to fall in the gaps among the insurance, securi-
ties, and futures regulatory authorities. For example, New York State has 
flip-flopped in the past year regarding whether to regulate credit default 
swaps as insurance. For years, New York State chose not to regulate cre-
dit default swaps as insurance. On September 22, 2008, the New York 
Insurance Department changed its mind and decided that, beginning in 
January 2009, credit default swaps “in cases where the buyer of the swap 
also owns the underlying bond it is meant to back” would be classified as 
insurance in New York.196 Less than two months later, New York sus-
pended its plan to regulate credit default swaps in light of the initiatives 
to regulate over-the-counter derivatives, including credit default swaps, 
announced by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets and 
the MOU signed by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the SEC, 
and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission to supervise credit 
default swap counterparties.197 
If a product meets a state’s definition of insurance, then both the prod-
uct and the firm offering it must be licensed by the state in order to sell 
                                                                                                             
abstract=1057401; Richard W. Gorvatt, Insurance Securitization: The Development of a 
New Asset Class 133 (Cas. Actuarial Soc’y, “Securitization of Risk” Discussion Paper 
Program, 1999), available at www.casact.org/pubs/dpp/dpp99/99dpp133.pdf; Changki 
Kim, Taehan Bae & Reginald J. Kulperger, Securitization of Motor Insurance Loss Rate 
Risks (Australian Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2008ACTL03, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134606. 
 194. E.g., INS. INFO. INST. & FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT 
BOOK 2006, at 133 (discussing credit derivatives); id. at 84 (discussing weather deriva-
tives). See also Frankel & LaPlume, supra note 193, at 205–06; Carayannopoulos, Ko-
vacs & Leadbetter, supra note 193; Gorvatt, supra note 193, at 144–48; Kim, Bae & Kul-
perger, supra note 193, at 2–3; Simone Barbibeau, Four Ways to Hedge Against Falling 
Home Prices, THESTREET.COM, Feb. 22, 2008, www.thestreet.com/print/story/10404177.html. 
Insurance securitization can take a number of forms other than the issuance of asset-
backed bonds. It can also involve forwards, futures, options, puts, and swaps. Some of 
these instruments are used to transfer risk, such as bonds and swaps, while others are 
used to provide contingent capital, such as catastrophic equity puts. 
 195. Danny Hakim, New York to Regulate Credit Default Swaps, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 
2008, at C10. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Press Release, Eric Dinello, Superintendent of Ins., N.Y. State Ins. Dep’t, Recog-
nizing Progress by Federal Government in Developing Oversight Framework for Credit 
Default Swaps, New York Will Stay Plan to Regulate Some Credit Default Swaps (Nov. 
20, 2008), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/press/2008/p0811201.htm. 
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the product within that state.198 So if New York had not suspended its 
decision to classify some credit default swaps as insurance, firms selling 
them in New York would have needed to be licensed as insurers. The 
states within the United States have a confusing series of licensing and 
post-licensing requirements for both the firm offering the product and the 
product itself. The exact type of licenses required varies from state to 
state. Some states issue a general insurance producer license, which al-
lows an individual or an entity to sell several insurance services, while 
others issue separate licenses for agents and brokers or issue separate 
licenses for each insurance line.199 
Traditionally, states have operated their insurance commissions as reg-
ulatory monopolies and have not engaged in regulatory competition, 
which exists to some degree between state and federal government agen-
cies that issue bank charters, and among states for the incorporation of 
businesses.200 Other than the periodic threats by the federal government 
that it will begin regulating insurance if the states fail to adopt reciprocal 
or uniform licensing requirements, the states have had few incentives to 
change their licensing procedures. If a company wants to offer insurance 
in a particular state, the company must comply with the licensing and 
post-licensing regulations for that state.201 
In addition to requiring different types of licenses, states have a range 
of requirements when potential insurance producers complete their appli-
cations. In some cases, these variations among the states’ applications are 
due to important differences on policy questions. New York and Califor-
nia require criminal background checks before allowing a person to sell 
insurance within their borders, but many other states do not require such 
                                                                                                             
 198. BAIR, MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 11. 
 199. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2002 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES 
REPORT 52 (2003). The NAIC defines “producer” as a person or entity “[l]icensed to 
offer several insurance services.” Id. In most cases, a producer will be a company, rather 
than an individual. 
 200. Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein have proposed recreating the type of regulatory 
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2009), at 36, 36. Their proposal, like the Congressional proposals to federalize insurance 
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 201. See Hillman Testimony, supra note 167, at 7 (noting that even if licensing regula-
tions are removed, there may still be post-licensing hurdles for insurance companies). 
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checks.202 In other cases, these variations have little or no rational basis. 
In Nevada, for example, pink paper is required when insurance compa-
nies file documentation pages for filing fees.203 Some states, such as 
Iowa, Kentucky, and Ohio, will return filings if they have not been 
stapled in the prescribed manner or assembled in the proper order.204 
Forty-three states do grant some form of reciprocity if a company has 
been granted a license in another state.205 States with major markets, like 
California, Florida, and New York, however, have not signed on to these 
reciprocity agreements.206 These agreements also do not extend to post-
licensing requirements.207 
In 2004, the University of Massachusetts Isenberg School of Manage-
ment completed a study (“Massachusetts Study”), which found that the 
multiple state reviews resulted in duplicative and inefficient regulatory 
efforts among the states.208 States have attempted to justify these duplica-
tive reviews as necessary to protect consumers, but the Massachusetts 
Study concluded that the extremely high caseloads for staff assigned to 
review producer licensing applications indicated that these applications 
may only be receiving a cursory review.209 On average, staff members 
had to review 1284 new applications per year.210 Such cursory reviews 
may fail to alert staff to producer problems, which is troubling “given . . . 
that producer misconduct generates the largest volume of complaints.”211 
The process might be a bit easier in the future for life insurance, annui-
ties, disability income, and long-term care insurance because the Inter-
state Insurance Product Regulation Commission (“IIPRC”) began cover-
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ing these products in 2007.212 The IIPRC was formed under the Interstate 
Insurance Compact proposed by the NAIC.213 The IIPRC provides a cen-
tral filing point for institutions seeking licenses for insurance products 
from the states that are parties to the compact. 214 The IIPRC initially had 
to rely on product filing examiners and other staff, who are on loan from 
member states.215 It did not get its own permanent staff until the spring of 
2008.216 Only thirty-two states, plus Puerto Rico, have signed the Inter-
state Insurance Compact and, once again, the states with the largest in-
surance markets, California, Connecticut, Florida, and New York, are not 
signatories to this agreement.217 It may be some time before an assess-
ment can be made as to whether the IIPRC has significantly improved 
the process for obtaining product licenses. 
In addition to having to complete multiple producer licensing and 
product licensing applications, an insurance company will find that it 
may take up to two years under normal circumstances to have all of the 
state insurance regulators review and approve the company’s applica-
tions.218 While the NAIC has made the adoption of national, uniform 
regulations one of its goals, the states have not made significant progress 
towards developing such regulations.219 Reciprocity arrangements, which 
a majority of states adopted in the wake of the GLBA, have shortened the 
time that it takes to complete the nonresident producer licensing 
process.220 Nevertheless, according to the Massachusetts Study, insurers 
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reported in 2003 that it took them six to nine months to get a product ap-
proved in the five largest states in which they did business.221 
If it takes two years for traditional insurance products to be approved 
by all of the state regulators, innovative products may take even longer, 
particularly if they are hybrid financial products that have characteristics 
similar to traditional banking or securities products.222 Hybrid products 
may require the approval of the federal or state banking or securities au-
thorities, in addition to the approval of the state insurance commission-
ers.223 
The problems caused by the licensing delays particularly disadvantage 
smaller insurance companies. These delays hinder the ability of smaller 
companies to expand operations.224 Survey data indicate that, under the 
current system, regulatory costs are proportionately higher for small in-
surers.225 Licensing delays discourage some forms of product and regula-
tory innovation. Some products are not brought to market because the 
costs of overcoming the initial regulatory approvals are high, and once 
they have been overcome, other firms may easily copy the product and 
sell it themselves.226 In these instances, the first mover bears the bulk of 
the costs while later movers reap the rewards. In addition, as the Massa-
chusetts Study noted, “Difficulties and time delays in securing form fil-
ing approvals inhibits the ability of life insurers to modify products in 
response to consumer demand and impairs competition with banks and 
securities firms that do not have to undergo advance merit review of 
permitted product offerings.”227 
Given that states cannot agree on uniform standards within the United 
States, it is doubtful that they would work well together when negotiating 
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international standards in the form of either soft law standards or prin-
ciples, or hard law found in treaties and other binding international 
agreements. David Snyder, Assistant General Counsel of the American 
Insurance Association, noted, “Despite the strong efforts of some regula-
tors, the state regulatory system is structurally incapable of representing 
U.S. interests effectively, because it must defend the inefficient U.S. reg-
ulatory system and it lacks the legal authority to bind the United 
States.”228 The states have recently attempted to increase their visibility 
in the IAIS. While the states within the United States only held one of 
the seats on the old IAIS executive committee, they now hold three of the 
twenty-one seats on the newly enlarged IAIS executive committee.229 In 
addition, a fourth U.S. regulator, who chairs a technical subgroup, sits as 
a nonvoting member on the committee.230 Sandy Praeger, the Kansas 
Insurance Commissioner, is leading the IAIS’s New Focus Task Force, 
which will be developing future goals of the IAIS.231 
C. Possible Solutions 
1. Office of Insurance Information and New Powers for USTR 
In March 2008, the U.S. Treasury issued its Blueprint for a Moder-
nized Financial Regulatory Structure (“Blueprint”).232 Each of the regula-
tory structures the Treasury proposed would correct the existing inability 
of the United States to engage in meaningful international negotiations 
on insurance issues. The Blueprint calls for the creation of an Office of 
Insurance Oversight “to deal with international [insurance] regulatory 
issues . . . [and to] advise the Secretary of the Treasury on major domes-
tic and international [insurance] policy issues.”233 
In response to the Treasury’s proposal, Representative Paul Kanjorski 
introduced the Insurance Information Act of 2008,234 which would create 
the Office of Insurance Information. This office would provide informa-
tion on insurance issues to Congress and to Executive Branch agencies. 
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In addition, the Insurance Information Act would give the federal gov-
ernment the power to negotiate treaties and international agreements set-
ting insurance regulatory standards and practices that would preempt 
state insurance laws.235 
The Insurance Information Act could effectively serve as a back-door 
means for implementing the same type of uniform rules that the proposed 
State Modernization and Regulatory Transparency Act (“SMART 
Act”)236 would have created. Former Representative Michael Oxley (a 
Republican from Ohio) and Representative Richard Baker (a Republican 
from Louisiana) conceived the SMART Act as a means of getting the 
states to overcome the lack of uniform regulations and the high costs of 
the state regulation of insurance.237 Representative Oxley tried to model 
the SMART Act after those provisions in the GLBA that threatened to 
create a federal regulator if the states failed to enact certain types of laws 
and regulations within a fixed timeframe.238 Those provisions in the 
GLBA spurred the states to enter into reciprocity agreements that re-
duced the number of state licensing applications insurers had to file. 
The SMART Act, if it had been enacted, would have required the 
states to adopt the NAIC model laws regarding market conduct within 
three years, or required that these model acts become law automatically 
at the end of the three-year period and preempt any contradictory laws.239 
It also would have required states to adopt the NAIC model laws govern-
ing licensing of insurers, producers, and reinsurers within two to three 
years or their laws would be preempted by the NAIC laws.240 In addition, 
the SMART Act would have required the states to end their regulation of 
rates after two years.241 
The SMART Act, however, was never even introduced into Congress 
as a bill. The insurance industry’s response to it was mixed and the states 
opposed it. What really doomed its introduction was its questionable 
constitutionality. The U.S. Supreme Court in New York v. United States 
stated that Congress cannot compel the states to enact or enforce a feder-
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al regulatory program.242 In addition, the Court in Printz v. United States 
asserted that the federal government cannot require state officers to ad-
dress particular problems.243 Both of these cases raised the specter that 
the states would have been able to launch a successful lawsuit to have the 
SMART Act struck down as invalid if Congress had ever enacted it. 
The Insurance Information Act would not suffer from these problems. 
In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court held that Congress can im-
pose national norms on the states through its treaty power.244 Missouri 
concerned the Migratory Bird Act of 1918, which implemented a con-
vention between the United States and Great Britain, while the latter still 
controlled Canada; this Act protected migratory birds that were on the 
verge of extinction from excessive hunting.245 Congress had previously 
tried to protect wildlife in various acts only to have the Supreme Court 
strike them down as exceeding Congress’s constitutional authority under 
the Commerce Clause.246 Senator Elihu Root proposed that Congress 
sidestep this problem by negotiating an international agreement with 
Great Britain covering migratory birds and then having Congress pass a 
statute to implement the agreement under its treaty powers.247 The Insur-
ance Information Act would allow Congress to follow the Missouri  
example by enacting legislation similar to the SMART Act as long as 
Congress could justify it as necessary to implement an international 
agreement. 
While the NAIC has endorsed the Insurance Information Act, some 
state legislators are opposed to it because they fear it will strip them of 
their ability to set insurance standards and regulations.248 They fear that 
standards negotiated by the federal government will be weaker than those 
currently administered by the states, thus harming consumers. 
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The Subcommittee forwarded the Insurance Information Act to the full 
Financial Services Committee on July 9, 2008, but Congress did not pass 
the bill before the end of its term.249 Several congressional supporters 
sent a letter on January 23, 2009, to Timothy Geithner urging him to 
create the Office of Insurance Information once he was confirmed as 
Treasury Secretary.250 Other groups have publicly opposed having the 
Office of Insurance Information created by fiat and demanded that it only 
be created through an act of Congress.251 If Treasury Secretary Geithner 
does not unilaterally create the Office of Insurance Information, then the 
Insurance Information Act will be reintroduced in the 111th Congress 
and stands a reasonable chance of enactment. 
2. Office of National Insurance 
If Congress does not enact the Insurance Information Act, it could still 
improve the United States’ ability to negotiate international agreements 
if it created an Office of National Insurance (“ONI”) and set up an op-
tional federal charter system for insurance. The U.S. Treasury Blueprint 
recommended such a scheme as an intermediate step in reforming the 
U.S. regulatory structure for financial services. This optional federal 
charter system would operate in a manner similar to the dual-chartering 
system currently used for banks.252 The proposal called for the creation 
of ONI within the Treasury and for it to be headed by a single National 
Insurance Commissioner.253 The Blueprint included a disclaimer that the 
Treasury is not opining upon or evaluating the merits of any pending leg-
islation before Congress to create an optional federal charter.254 The 
Treasury did recommend that any legislation authorizing the creation of 
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an optional federal chartering system should provide for “solvency regu-
lation, market competition, and consumer protection.”255 
Nevertheless, the optional federal charter envisioned by the Blueprint 
looked similar to the one detailed in the proposed National Insurance Act 
of 2007 (“NIA”),256 which Congress was already considering. The 110th 
Congress never enacted the NIA before the end of its term.257 Two of the 
NIA’s original sponsors, Representative Melissa Bean of Illinois and 
Representative Edward Royce of California, introduced a new optional 
federal insurance charter bill into Congress on April 2, 2009.258 This bill, 
the National Insurance Consumer Protection Act (“NICPA”),259 contains 
many of the same features as the NIA, but would also create a systemic 
regulator for financial institutions. 
The NICPA provides insurers with the option of seeking a state charter 
or a federal charter to write life or property/casualty insurance policies. It 
would create a new federal insurance agency, the ONI, which is modeled 
after the OCC and is also located within the Treasury Department.260 The 
ONI would be run by one commissioner appointed by the President for a 
five-year term.261 
The ONI would regulate national insurers, national insurance agencies, 
federally licensed producers, and reinsurers.262 Regulations promulgated 
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by the ONI would preempt state laws for the ONI-regulated entities with 
regard to licensing, examinations, reporting, and regulations concerning 
the sale or underwriting of insurance, but would not preempt state laws 
governing property, taxes, workers’ compensation, or motor vehicle in-
surance.263 Although insurers subject to state regulation would retain the 
antitrust exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, national insurers 
and other entities regulated by ONI would lose this exemption except in 
connection with the development and use of standardized forms, or to the 
extent that they are subject to state law.264 
Furthermore, the ONI would give the federal government the power to 
negotiate international agreements establishing standards for national 
insurers without necessarily requiring that such agreements preempt state 
law.265 Under the Act, the commissioner may engage in negotiations re-
garding international or multilateral agreements covering insurance but 
he is required to consult with the president and the U.S. trade representa-
tive.266 Unlike the NIA, the NICPA does not expressly state that the 
commissioner may include a state insurance regulators’ representative in 
such negotiations, although it does not prohibit him from doing so.267 
While the NICPA would improve the ability of the United States to 
negotiate international agreements on insurance regulation, Congress 
probably will not enact it without making significant changes to its con-
sumer protection provisions. The NIA failed to be enacted by the 110th 
Congress, in part, due to concerns over the weakness of the consumer 
protections provided for in the Act. Representative Barney Frank, who 
chairs the House Financial Services Committee, was on record as oppos-
ing any optional federal charter bill that does not adequately protect con-
sumers.268 Unfortunately, the sponsors of the NICPA have made cosmet-
ic changes, such as inserting “Consumer Protection” into the name of the 
Act, to try to hide the fact that the NICPA actually provides even weaker 
consumer protections than the NIA. 
The name of the NICPA is misleading. It implies that the Act is based 
on the Insurance Consumer Protection Act of 2003 (“ICPA”),269 which 
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former Senator Fritz Hollings of South Carolina introduced into the 
108th Congress. The ICPA differs significantly from the NICPA. First, 
the ICPA required national insurers to be regulated by the federal gov-
ernment; it did not allow them to engage in regulatory arbitrage by al-
lowing them the option of choosing their regulator as the NIA does.270 
Second, the ICPA would have repealed the McCarran-Ferguson Act and 
eliminated the insurance industry’s antitrust exemption while the NICPA 
only provides for a limited repeal of the exemption for nationally char-
tered insurers.271 
Third, the ICPA brought up to the federal level most of the major state 
consumer protection regulations, including price regulations on insurance 
products and services.272 The NICPA, on the other hand, eliminates price 
regulation of insurance products for nationally chartered insurers and 
only requires the commissioner to adopt by regulation the market con-
duct standards found in two NAIC model laws, the Unfair Trade Practic-
es Act and the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.273 This is a major 
departure from state regulation as every state but Illinois has some form 
of price regulations for insurance products.274 The NICPA requires the 
commissioner to consider NAIC standards, model laws, practices, and 
procedures when formulating regulations for ONI-regulated entities, but 
does not require that he actually adopt NAIC standards with regard to 
accounting and disclosure, auditing, risk management, internal controls, 
investments, capital and liquidity, actuarial opinions, or reinsurance.275 
While the absence of price regulations is consistent with NIA,276 the 
NICPA’s requirements regarding NAIC standards appear weaker than 
the NIA’s provisions. The 2006 and 2007 versions of the NIA would 
have required the commissioner to promulgate consumer protection regu-
lations consistent with the standards and model laws developed by the 
NAIC.277 The commissioner would have two years to issue these regula-
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tions, and they would have to remain in place for five years after their 
effective date.278 After this five-year period, the commissioner would be 
free to set whatever consumer protections standards that he chose. These 
provisions cover a broader range of NAIC models and put limits on the 
commissioner’s ability to amend the regulations implementing these 
model laws at the federal level. In contrast, the language in the NICPA 
only requires the commissioner to adopt two NAIC model laws by regu-
lation and does not appear to put any limits on the commissioner’s ability 
to amend these regulations after they are adopted. 
It is doubtful that Representative Frank and others, such as the Con-
sumer Federation of America, who were uncomfortable with the level of 
consumer protections in the NIA, will find the NICPA acceptable.279 As 
a result, it is unlikely that the Congress will enact the NICPA without 
substantially amending its consumer protection provisions.  
3. Delegating Negotiating Authority 
Another way of correcting the problem that the U.S. regulatory struc-
ture for insurance poses for concluding binding international agreements 
would be to have Congress pass a law allowing the states, either directly 
or through the NAIC, to negotiate international insurance agreements.280 
Even if Congress gives this authority to the NAIC, it will not completely 
correct the problem because the NAIC currently has no power to force 
the states to adopt any standards that it espouses. In order to create bind-
ing international agreements, all of the states would have to consent to be 
bound by any agreement that the NAIC concluded and to adopt the laws 
necessary to implement it. 
Allowing the individual states to negotiate directly with foreign nations 
concerning international insurance regulatory standards would be prob-
lematic. First, states would need to be convinced that undertaking such 
negotiations is in their interests. As previously mentioned, state legisla-
tures typically include little or no funds within insurance commission 
budgets for the promotion of international cooperation on insurance mat-
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 280. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 allows states to enter into agreements with foreign powers 
with the consent of Congress. Since the NAIC is a collective organization of state insur-
ance commissioners, allowing it to negotiate with foreign nations may fall within this part 
of the U.S. Constitution. 
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ters. Second, other nations are unlikely to want to deal with fifty different 
state actors. For example, it is not clear that international organizations 
like the WTO would accept a delegation comprised of fifty representa-
tives, each from a different state with different negotiating positions. 
Given their inability to adopt uniform standards within the United States, 
they probably would not be willing or able to agree on a uniform position 
for international negotiations. 
These negotiations between states and other nations could be further 
complicated if Congress decides to pass a law allowing insurers to be 
licensed in any state, but to operate in all fifty states.281 Such a law would 
make insurance regulation in the United States look like the laws govern-
ing incorporation. The advantages of such a scheme are that it would al-
low insurers to deal with a single set of rules because they would only 
have to comply with the insurance laws of the state in which they are 
chartered, while encouraging regulatory competition among states.282 
The true desirability of this type of regulatory competition depends on 
whether it encourages a race-to-the-top or a race-to-the-bottom. It is like-
ly that creating this kind of regulatory competition in the insurance sector 
would produce a race-to-the-bottom because insurance companies would 
probably seek out the state with the weakest regulatory standards in order 
to maximize their profits.283 Consumers certainly could try to apply mar-
ket pressure on companies by not buying insurance from those chartered 
in extremely weak regulatory regimes. It is doubtful, however, that con-
sumers will know or understand the differences in the insurance regulato-
ry regimes of all fifty states well enough to make informed decisions. 
Such competition is likely to produce winners and losers and, in effect, 
narrow the field of states with which foreign governments would feel the 
                                                                                                             
 281. Butler and Ribstein have proposed such a reform. See Butler & Ribstein, supra 
note 200, at 36. 
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 283. Butler and Ribstein recognize that this is a potential problem. They have tried to 
build in safeguards that would provide a floor level of regulation in the areas of solvency 
regulation and consumer protection. Id. at 40–41. These minimum regulations do not 
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ready require. For example, they do not appear to require that criminal background 
checks be part of the process to become licensed as an insurance provider. Both New 
York and California require criminal background checks for firms seeking to offer insur-
ance within their borders. See Hillman Testimony, supra note 167, at 6 (specifically refe-
rencing California). As a result, consumers in those states would be worse off if insurers 
traded their New York and California licenses for licenses in states meeting the minimum 
requirements set by Butler and Ribstein. 
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need to negotiate. It is possible that one state could come to dominate 
insurance chartering the way that Delaware dominates corporate char-
ters.284 If this occurred, foreign nations would likely only negotiate with 
that state and perhaps the two or three other states with the largest insur-
ance markets, such as California, Florida, New York, and Texas. Under 
these circumstances, the other states may feel compelled to adopt the 
same standards in order to maintain their competitive position, or at least 
avoid weakening it further. 
Such a scheme runs counter to how the Framers of the Constitution 
envisaged U.S. foreign affairs. Article I of the Constitution gives Con-
gress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations,”285 and Ar-
ticle II gives the president the power to make treaties with the advice and 
consent of two-thirds of the Senate.286 While the Constitution expressly 
permits the states to enter into international agreements with other na-
tions with the consent of Congress,287 this provision has rarely been uti-
lized. 
CONCLUSION 
If moving from soft law norms and standards for insurance regulation 
to hard law in the form of treaties or binding international agreements is 
desirable, then the U.S. regulatory structure needs to be reformed to ena-
ble it to participate effectively in international negotiations. The current 
division between the states’ ability to regulate insurance and the federal 
government’s authority to conduct international negotiations has stymied 
efforts to date to move beyond the status quo in the area of insurance 
regulation. The easiest and most likely way to resolve this issue is for 
Congress to reintroduce and pass the Insurance Information Act. 
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